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WELCOME TO NEW COLUMBIA: THE FISCAL, ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF STATEHOOD FOR D.C.
David Schleicher*
Returning from work on a stormy day a few months ago, I was somewhat
surprised to find the lampposts on the street covered in D.C. Statehood signs. While
such campaigns ebb and flow, this level of full-street coverage was, to say the least,
impressive. At that moment, with a whoosh of wind, the banners fell off one of the
lampposts and flew down Connecticut Avenue. Independence, you might say, was
in the air.
And with good reason, too: the District is booming. Over the past five years, the
economic growth of metro D.C. has dramatically outstripped the nation as a whole.'
In 2013, D.C.'s population rose at a faster rate than every state but North Dakota,2
growth that is particularly startling given D.C.'s high housing prices.3 Indeed, at
646,449, its population has come to exceed that of Wyoming and Vermont.4 Given this
growth, it is not surprising that there are increased calls for a new political status.
For too long, however, the statehood debate has overwhelmingly focused on the
same set of issues: the impact of statehood on the federal government's structure.
* Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law; Irving S. Ribicoff
Visiting Associate Professor, Yale Law School. I would like to thank Jeremy Greenberg and
Daniel Rauch for their excellent research assistance.
' See Carol Morello & Dan Keating, D.C. Region is Nation's Richest, Most Educated
Region in the Nation, Census Data Show, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2010, at Al.
2 See Michael A. Memoli, California Back on Growth Path, but North Dakota Sets the
Pace, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/30/nation/la-na-nn
-north-dakota-fastest-population-growth-20131230. Reporting on population flows frequently
fails to acknowledge the role played by housing prices. But the cost of housing is simply the
price of admission into a city. Regions and cities with low housing costs (because they do
not restrict housing supply with strict zoning restrictions), like Houston and Atlanta, have
seen huge population inflows despite having lower wages than cities like San Francisco, New
York, or Washington, where demand for housing has expressed itself in high prices because
of strict limits on housing supply. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J.
1670, 1674-75 (2013) [hereinafter Schleicher 2013].
3 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE
UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2013
(2013), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/totals/2013.
4 District ofColumbia, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU(Mar. 27,2014, 9:54 AM), http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/1 1000.html; David Shuster, Racism on Display: Washington,
D.C. 's Status in Congress, HUFFINGTONPOST(Jan. 17,2013, 10:36 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/david-shuster/racist-to-the-core-the-co_b_2492360.html.
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These issues take a variety of forms-from high-theoretic discussions on the nature
of representation to gritty questions of Congressional party power.' Yet if D.C. did
become a state, the most impactful change in its citizens' lives would not be their
new ability to elect members of Congress; it would be the dramatic shift in economics
and politics that would come with the creation of a new, single-city state government.
If we want to know what life will be like in the proposed New Columbia, these changes
must be our starting point.6
This Essay sketches some of the long-term economic and political consequences
of D.C. statehood. My goal is not to add to the chorus of supporters or opponents of
statehood; instead, I aim to flesh out some of the unseen promise and peril that D.C.
statehood would bring. On the day New Columbia enters the Union, it would bear
a constellation of features unprecedented in the nation: the only state wholly part of
one metropolitan region,7 the only state without local governments, and the only
wholly urban state. These features, which to date have seldom been considered, have
deep implications for the advisability of statehood when compared to the alterna-
tives of retrocession (becoming part of Maryland)' or the stateless status quo. At the
same time, these features also furnish a blueprint for steps to mitigate the risks and
exploit the benefits that statehood, if pursued, would offer.
A quick overview: Part I of this Essay will discuss the special fiscal and economic
conditions that New Columbia would face. On one hand, statehood would better allow
D.C. to take advantage of periods of economic success. In particular, a state of New
Columbia would likely be free of the restrictive confines of the Height of Buildings
Act, allowing for greater growth when demand for living in D.C. is high.' Moreover,
as has been noted elsewhere, the District would likely also gain greater taxing power
s See, e.g., Shani 0. Hilton, Surprise: D.C StatehoodNot a GOP Priority, NBC WASH.
(Aug. 22,2012, 1:23 PM), http://www.nbcwashington.com/blogs/first-read-dmv/SurpriseDC
-Statehood-Not-a-GOP-Priority-167051805.html; Shuster, supra note 4.
6 The name "New Columbia" has been proposed by statehood advocates as a possible name
for the state of D.C., and so has been adopted for this Essay. See New Columbia Admission
Act, H.R. 292, 113th Cong. (2013).
' Rhode Island comes close, with thirty-eight ofthirty-nine municipalities in the Providence-
Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA Metropolitan Statistical Area. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
MAY 2013 METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN AREA DEFINITIONS (2013), available at
http://stats.bls.gov/oes/current/msadef.htm#77200 [hereinafter MAY2013 METROPOLITAN].
8 The present territory of the District was delimited by 1801 through the District of
Columbia Organic Act. See MICHAELK. FAUNTROY, HOME RULE OR HOUSE RULE? CONGRESS
AND THE EROSION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 29 (2003). Under
the Act, both Virginia and Maryland ceded parts of their territory to form the new district.
Id. In 1846, however, those portions of the District that Virginia ceded were returned to their
original state. Id. As a result, all land in the current District has its territorial origins in Maryland.
Thus, in theory, the District's land and people could legally be combined with Maryland through
appropriate legislation.
' See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
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(although it would lose some forms of generous federal funding, particularly in its
Medicaid program).'o Yet such benefits come at a price: as a single-city state, New
Columbia would face drastic risks in times of downturn. The fact that New Columbia
would be entirely in one economic region, and the fact that it would exclusively be
the center city of that region, would mean almost necessarily that the state would
face substantial financial risks in the case of regional and urban-form related
shocks." Moreover, states frequently redistribute money from successful parts of the
state to the unsuccessful to mitigate regional downturns: New Columbia would not
have this ability. What's more, in the event of financial catastrophe, New Columbia
would also be ineligible for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, insofar as it would be a state and
not a municipality.
Such a dynamic understanding of New Columbia's fiscal and economic condi-
tions makes the case for statehood weaker and the case in favor of retrocession to an
adjoining state, a status which would allow for the potential for growth while en-
suring a fiscal safety net, much stronger. Alternatively, if statehood were to proceed,
I argue the New Columbians should adopt several structural protections against eco-
nomic volatility. In particular, I argue in favor of a budget rule that results in the auto-
matic development of a "rainy day fund" in prosperous times, and a state constitution
that eschews a balanced budget rule.
Part II discusses the implications of New Columbia's unique internal politics. As
noted, New Columbia would be the only state without local governments. The
absence of separate spheres for local and state elections would have at least two
major implications for New Columbia's politics and policy. First, as a state composed
of an overwhelmingly single-party city, New Columbia's elections would likely be
decidedly uncompetitive. Even in the status quo, this absence of party-level electoral
competition is a likely cause of many pathologies in D.C. politics, from excessive
restrictions on growth to its persistent problems with corruption. To ensure the state
of New Columbia does not share these defects, any move towards statehood will need
to include reforms aimed at introducing more political competition. Second, and more
optimistically, the unprecedented marriage of a city and a state government offers a
powerful change for innovation. Historically, the relatively circumscribed legal power
of cities has prevented them from pursuing a number of effective policies because
such powers are the exclusive province of states. Further, big cities are often losers
in state political fights. 2 In this context, New Columbia's fusion of city and state
provides many opportunities for policy flexibility and discovery unavailable to most
big cities.
'o See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
12 George Washington Plunkitt famously described New York City as "pie for the hayseeds"
in the state government in Albany. WILIAM L. RIORDAN, PLUNKrrT OF TAMMANY HALL: A
SERIES OF VERY PLAIN TALKS ON VERY PRACTICAL PoLrTIcs 21 (1963).
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I. NEW COLUMBIAN EcoNOMICs
So far, most literature on the economics of D.C. statehood focuses on the static,
short-term consequences on the city's budget.13 Such work is important but ignores
a crucial reality; over the long run, a state's fiscal health depends substantially on the
dynamic question of how resiliently it responds to economic change. This section
argues that the way New Columbia responds to long-term economic change is crucial
to assessing whether statehood would actually help D.C. residents and, if statehood is
pursued, what legislative and constitutional structures might best ensure prosperity.
Before proceeding, though, it is important to summarize the traditional arguments
for and against the economics ofD.C. statehood. In the status quo, the District is caught
in a bind: it is obligated to pay for services and programs commonly provided by states,
but not provided with the tax powers states generally possess.
First, expenditures: the District has all sorts of responsibilities that accrue to states,
and not cities, like Medicaid, child and family services, and higher education. A
2005 study by the Fiscal Policy Institute and the Brookings Institution found that these
state-like services cost the city $1.1 billion annually.14 Some of this was traditionally
offset by an annual payment by the federal government.15
To some extent, these additional expenses were mitigated in 1997. That year, the
Federal Government passed the Revitalization Act, which removed some of the state-
like responsibilities of D.C. in return for ending the annual federal payment to the
District.'" The federal government began paying for the D.C. judicial and incarceration
systems, increased the matching rate for its Medicaid funding to offset what the city
would ordinarily receive from a state government, and assumed responsibility for
the unfunded pension liabilities racked up before the Home Rule Act. 7 More recent
changes increased funding for the WMATA, the regional transportation body, 8 and
gave D.C. residents the ability to attend any state university at the in-state rate ' 9-an
" See, e.g., William Raspberry, WhySeekStatehoodforD.C ?, WASH. POST, Sept.26, 1988,
at Al 5.
" Ed Lazere & David Garrison,A New Federal Contribution to the District ofColumbia,
Need, Likely Impact, and Some Options, BROOKINGS INST. 3 (2005), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2005/11 /cities%201azere/20051116
_dcinfrastructure.pdf.
15 Id.
6 National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251; ALICE RIVLIN ET AL., BUILDING THE BEST CAPITALCITY IN THE
WORLD 81,100 (2008) [hereinafter RIVLIN 2008].
" Lazere & Garrison, supra note 14, at 3.
8 See Clean Railroads Act of 2008, H.R. 2095, 110th Cong. § 601 (authorizing some
$1.5 billion in additional federal funding for WMATA's infrastructure).
" See District of Columbia College Access Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-98, § 3, 113 Stat.
1323 (1999).
92 [Vol. 23:89
WELCOME TO NEW COLUMBIA
acknowledgment that states and not cities are usually responsible for higher education.
Nevertheless, many such special spending obligations still remain in place.20
At the same time, D.C. faces several limits in its ability to raise revenue. The central
limit on the D.C. government's ability to raise revenue is that, as part of the Home Rule
Act, Congress explicitly barred the city from taxing the income of non-residents who
work in the District.2 1 Every state that taxes incomes includes a tax on non-residents
who work in the state,22 but Virginia and Maryland successfully fought to include this
limit in the Home Rule Act.23 In 1997, economists estimated that this limit costs the
District government $1.4 billion annually.24 In 2005, the city estimated that the cost was
$2.2 billion,25 and the number is surely higher now, as incomes in the region have been
rising substantially (for purposes of comparison, the 2015 overall budget estimate is
$6.5 billion2 6). The District is treated like a city for taxing purposes, not a state.
Nevertheless, statehood would not be a short-term budgetary panacea. In particular,
New Columbia would be in a far worse taxing position than other states because of the
huge amount of nontaxable property in the District. For example, federal land takes up
28% of the District's land acreage.27 If the District could tax this property, it would
increase its revenue by $550 million.28 The District still, however, has responsibility to
provide police, fire, and other services for these areas. 29 Further, another 3.9% of the
District's taxable wealth is owned by non-profits. 30 When combined with other
property tax exempt properties, 42% of the total property wealth of the city cannot be
taxed.31 Moreover, a state of New Columbia would largely lack wealthy suburbs that
could engage in transfer payments with the central city.32
20 See Lazere & Garrison, supra note 14, at 4.
2' D.C. CODE § 1-206.02(a)(5) (2013).
22 CAROL O'CLEIREACAIN, THE ORPHANED CAPITAL: ADOPTING THE RIGHT REVENUES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 103-05 (1997).
23 For more on these negotiations, see id. at 105.
24 CAROL O'CLEIREACAIN & ALICE M. RIVLIN, A SOUND FISCAL FOOTING FOR THE
NATION'S CAPITAL: A FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY 4 (2012).
25 See RILIN 2008, supra note 16, at 21 n.13 (citing YESIM YILMAZ, D.C. OFFICE OF
REVENUE ANALYSIS, CALCULATING THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PREEMPTIONS ON THE DISTRICT'S
TAX REVENUE 4 (DRAFT Mar. 5, 2008)).
26 Letter from Natwar M. Gandhi to Mayor Vincent Gray and Chairman Phil Mendelson
(Nov. 3, 2013), available at http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication
/attachments/FINAL FY_2015_CurrentServicesFundingLevelBudget%5Bl%5D.pdf.
27 O'CLEIREACAIN & RIVLIN, supra note 24, at 4.
28 Id
29 Id. at 3.
30 Joseph Cordes, The Nonprofit Property Tax Exemption: Who Benefits, Who Pays, and
by How Much, URBAN BROOKINGS TAX POL'Y CENTER (May. 2, 2012), http://urban.org
/taxandcharities/upload/panel- 1 -cordes.pdf.
3 O'CLEIREACAIN & RIvLIN, supra note 24, at 4.
32 See RIVLIN 2008, supra note 16, at 25 (describing how the city of Baltimore, unlike
D.C., is able to receive assistance from other parts of its state).
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Recognizing these counterveiling forces, Alice Rivlin, a former Director of the
federal Office of Management and Budget and leading expert on the budgetary effects
of statehood,33 concluded that it is unclear if statehood would improve or harm the
fiscal position of the District:
The net effect of all these fiscal positives and negatives associated
with statehood is extremely uncertain. My guess is that statehood
would bring positive net fiscal benefits to the District, provided it
included the power to tax non-resident income (except for a fed-
eral enclave), although losing the savings from the Revitalization
Act of 1997 would offset a large fraction of the gain.34
Up to this point, however, the traditional debate has focused on statehood's
immediate impact on the city budget. What is not acknowledged, though, is the vast
impact that dynamic economic change would have on the finances of New Columbia.
As I outline below, these effects would be substantial. In brief, statehood would have
a dramatic pro cyclical effect on the local budget, permitting the District to take better
advantage of good times, but leaving it at greater risk in downturns.
Begin with the advantage that New Columbia would enjoy during boom times.
Perhaps the strictest and least rational restraint the federal government puts on the
district is the Height ofBuildings Act,3 restricting the height ofbuildings in D.C. based
on the width of nearby streets. D.C.'s economy is currently doing extremely well,
but the restrictions of the Height Act (combined with D.C.'s restrictive zoning re-
gime, which will later be discussed), have meant that the city faces an enormous crisis
in providing housing and office space. D.C. currently has the nation's lowest office
vacancy rate," and the central business district has the third highest rent per square
foot.39 Housing is similarly expensive.4 0
" See id. at 9.
3 IftheDistrict ofColumbia Becomes a State: Fiscal Consequences: Hearing Before the
Spec. Comm. On StatehoodandSelfDetermination (D.C. 2009) (statement ofAlice M. Rivlin).
3 Building Height Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-196, 36 Stat. 452 (1910).
36 D.C. CODE § 6-601.05 (2014).
37 Joel Kotkin, The Expanding Wealth of Washington, FORBES (Mar. 19,2012, 9:32 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2012/03/19/the-expanding-wealth-of-washington.
38 Jeff Clabaugh, D.C. Has Nation's Lowest Office Vacancy Rate, WASH. Bus. J. (Aug. 26,
2013), http://www.bizjoumals.com/washington/breakingground/2013/08/dc-has-nations-lowest
-office-vacancy.html.
3 Ken McCarthy, Some Needed Perspective on Sluggish Leasing, COM. OBSERVER
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://commercialobserver.com/2013/09/some-needed-perspective-on-sluggish
-leasing/.
40 Justin Karp, Washington, D.C. Renting Costs Among Highest in Nation, Report Says,
WJLA (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.wjla.com/articles/2012/04/washington-d-c-renting-costs
-among-highest-in-nation-report-says-7445 8.html.
94 [Vol. 23:89
WELCOME TO NEW COLUMBIA
If D.C. became a state (orjoined Maryland through retrocession), the Height of
Buildings Act would likely be held unconstitutional. 41 Freed from such restrictions,
D.C. would be able to accommodate growth far more effectively during boom times.
Such growth could take many forms. For example, Vince Gray, the city's current
mayor, has called for modifications in the Height Act to allow taller buildings down-
town (a 25% increase above the height limit in the L'Enfant City) and greater density
along Metro lines.42 In any case, removing building height restrictions would make
D.C. an even more economically vibrant place in prosperous times.
This newfound ability to harness growth, however, comes at a cost: when lean
times hit New Columbia, they will hit with a vengeance.
No city booms forever. Downturns inevitably occur for any number of reasons:
changes in transportation costs, tastes, politics, or the demands of the broader macro-
economy.4 3 Moreover, these shifts are often caused by forces beyond the control of
local, city, or state decision-makers.
41' The power Congress is invoking in passing district-wide restrictions on height is surely
its power over the District under Article 1, Section 17 of the Constitution. While the federal
government could surely still limit heights of buildings in some parts of the city under its
other powers, it would need to justify why parts of New Columbia that are further from the
White House than unrestricted Rosslyn, Virginia, need height restrictions. Acknowledging this
as part of a push for statehood, proponents suggested that, prior to statehood, the District could
give the Department of Interior a "scenic easement" that prevents anyone from building
above the limits set by the Height Act. See The Economic and Financial Impacts ofDistrict of
Columbia Statehood: Hearing Before Spec. Comm. on Statehood and SelfDetermination (D.C.
2009) (statement of Walter Smith), available at http://www.web.archive.org/web/201308
14103015/http://www.dcvote.org/trellis/struggle/statehoodtestimonysmith.pdf; then click
"Browse History"; then select "August 14, 2013"). However, such a proposal is probably not
constitutional for two reasons. First, under the equal footing doctrine, states must be admitted
as equal sovereigns, and a state without the power to regulate heights would not be equal to
other sovereigns. See generally Valerie J. M. Brader, Congress'Pet: Why the Clean AirAct's
Favoritism ofCalfornia Is Unconstitutional Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS
W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. &POL'Y 119, 151 (2007). Further, zoning is part of a state's police power
and it cannot be held to a contract delegating that much of its police power. Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,373 (1926); see also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1, 21-23 (1977) (holding essential parts of a state's police power cannotbe contracted away).
42 See Changes to the Heights Act: Shaping Washington, D.C., for the Future, Part II:
Hearing Before H. Comm. On Oversight and Reform, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of
Harriet Tregoning, Director of the Office of Planning), available at http://oversight.house
.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Tregoning.pdf; Richard Simon, Washington, D. C., Might
Finally Get Tall Buildings, GOVERNING (Dec. 3, 2013) available at http://www.goveming
.com/news/headlines/Washington-Might-Finally-Get-Tall-Buildings-.html; Aaron Wiener,
Issa OffersHopeforD. C. Autonomy on Building Heights, WASH. CrrYPAPER(Dec. 2,2013),
available at http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2013/12/02/issa
-offers-hope-for-d-c-autonomy-on-building-heights/.
43 See Schleicher 2013, supra note 2, at 1692-93 (noting that cities which do not substan-
tially hinder new development see larger population growths).
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What form might these shocks take in D.C.? One possibility would be that the
recent trend toward the urbanization of wealthy professionals," a trend that has greatly
bolstered D.C.'s finances, slows or reverses. Other areas in the D.C. Metro-Region, like
Rosslyn or Tyson's Comer, could develop into true downtowns, challenging D.C. for
dominance in the region. Moreover, D.C.'s economy is substantially concentrated in
a limited number of sectors, such as law (even more than those other parts of the
nation that are highly dependent on federal money, like Northern Virginia's govern-
ment and consultant heavy economy).45 Shocks specific to these industries-increased
regulation of lobbying, for instance, or deregulation of the legal market-might be
felt particularly hard in D.C. Or, perhaps, a terrorist attack in D.C. could harm the city
without harming the general region.
Whatever the cause, over time, at least some regional downturn is likely to im-
pact D.C. at some point. If and when it does, the state of New Columbia would be
particularly hard-pressed to cope with downturn.
First and foremost, as a state existing wholly within one metropolitan area, New
Columbia would be unable to call on resources from regions that did not face a similar
shock. This is a sharp contrast to other state governments, which commonly make
such transfers in times of regional decline. New York State, for example, transferred
substantial resources from upstate areas to New York City during the urban down-
turn of the 1970s,46 but today shifts resources from downstate to upstate to mitigate
that region's relative decline.47 Maryland's overall economy was once powered by
4 See ALAN EHRENHALT, THE GREAT INVERSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN
CrrY 3-5 (2012); David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1507, 1511-12 (2010); Schleicher 2013, supra note 2, at 1689-90.
4' As of 2010, Northern Virginia region had 12,565 legal jobs out of a total regional
population of roughly 2.8 million, a ratio of one lawyer per 223 citizens. See Stephen S.
Fuller & Ellen Harpel, Workforce Trends and Occupational Forecasts for Northern Virginia
2010-2020, GMU REGIONAL STUDIES (June 2011), available at http://cra.gmu.edu/pdfs
/studies_reports presentations/WorkforceTrends andOccupationalForecasts inNorthern
Virginia.pdf. By contrast, D.C. has 51,928 lawyers for a population of roughly 610,000, an
incredible ratio of one legal job per twelve citizens. See American Bar Association National
Lawyer Population, AM. BAR AsS'N (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/administrative/marketresearch/2013natllawyer10_year_trends
.authcheckdam.pdf.
46 For a view ofNew York State's support ofNew York City during the bankruptcy crisis
of the 1970s, see Flushing Nat. Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp. for City ofNew York, 358
N.E.2d 848, 855 (N.Y. 1976).
47 Cf Jaison R. Abel & Richard Deitz, New Measures of Economic Growth and
Productivity in Upstate New York, 14 CURRENT ISSUES IN EcoN. & FIN. 9 (2008), available
athttp://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current issues/cil4-9.html (showing how upstate New
York has poorer economic growth than downstate and the rest to coultry); Giving and
Getting: Regional Distribution ofRevenue and Spending in the New York State Budget, Fiscal
Year 2009-10, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOv'T (Dec. 2011), available at http:
//www.rockinst.org/pdf/nys government/2011-12-Giving and Getting.pdf. For data on upstate
New York's decline in manufacturing, see Jason Brain & Michael Anderson, Declining
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Baltimore's economic dynamism, 48 but now it transfers money from the rich suburbs
of D.C. to prop up Baltimore's challenged economy.49 A state of New Columbia,
however, would be unable to make such transfers.
To see the impact of this limit, consider Rhode Island. Today, Rhode Island is
almost entirely part of the Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA Metropolitan
Statistical Area.so During the recent economic downturn, a large number of Rhode
Island municipalities faced fiscal crises, including one bankruptcy in Central Falls."
But the state, faced with simultaneous local crises and fiscal problems of its own,
was in no position to help.52 As a result, Rhode Island was particularly vulnerable
to economic harm.
Moreover, should fiscal catastrophe come to pass, the state of New Columbia
would be far less equipped to request national assistance. The national government
has thus far maintained a strict "no bailout" rule for state governments, seeking to
avoid moral hazard." Moreover, cities have access to Chapter 9 bankruptcy, but as
a state government, New Columbia would not.54 As a result, should a D.C. economic
downturn become a budget crisis, the state of New Columbia would lack access to
several crucial means of recovery.
Manufacturing Employment in the New York-New Jersey Region: 1969-1999, 7 CURRENT
ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1 (2001).
48 See generally Eleanor S. Bruchey, The Development ofBaltimore Business: 1880-1914,
MD. HIST. MAG., Spring 1969, at 18-42 (describing the industrial development of Baltimore
between 1880-1914).
49 O'CLEIREACAIN &RIvLiN, supra note 24, at 9-10 (discussing present-day wealth transfers
to Baltimore). Other examples of such city-to-non-city regional transfers are quite common in
either direction. In Washington State, Seattle's economy is a substantial net contributor to
rural coffers, while in Minnesota, redistribution from rural areas subsidizes city services. See
Linking State Spending to Where Taxes are Generated is a Bad Idea, SEATrLE T. ONLINE
(Jan. 23, 2011,4:15 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/editorials/2014001088_edit24onestate
.html; Ben Oleson, A BriefHistory ofMinnesota's System ofGovernment Finance, STRONG
TowNs (2011), http://www.webarchive.org/web/20111114030027/http://www.strongtowns
.org/storage/reports/A%20Brief/o20History%200f%20Minnesota's%2OSystem%20of
%20Local%20Government%20Finance%201960-2010.pdf.
50 See MAY 2013 METROPOLITAN, supra note 7.
" See Jess Bidgood, Plan to EndBankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012, at A21.
52 Mary Williams Walsh & Abby Goodnough, A Small City's Depleted Pension Fund
Rattles Rhode Island, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2011, at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/07/12/business/central-falls-ri-faces-bankruptcy-over-pension-promises.html
?pagewanted=all& r-0.
53 See David A. Skeel, Jr., States ofBankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 677, 704-06 (2012)
(describing how federal bailouts for states is not feasible). The federal government's reluctance
to bail out the states is longstanding, beginning in the 1840s. See Thomas Sargent, An American
History Lesson For Europe, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2012, at A17, available at http://online
.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052970204740904577193032770537826.
5 Skeel, supra note 53, at 679-80 (noting that municipalities may file for bankruptcy
while state governments lack that option).
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By contrast, in the status quo, D.C. can call on the federal government for
assistance. Indeed, as a creature of the federal government, D.C. can countercyclically
benefit from boom times anywhere else in the country when compensating for local
challenges." Moreover, when the District faces fiscal crisis, as it did in 1997, it is able
to turn to the federal government for help (as discussed above).56
Taken together, what do these procyclical changes mean for the case for D.C.
statehood? They certainly strengthen the case for retrocession (joining with Maryland)
instead of statehood. Retrocession would allow the District to harness the benefits of
boom times-such as by changing building regulations-while allowing for transfers
in times of trouble.
However, if statehood were pursued, there are a number of specific protections
New Columbia could design to mitigate a boom-bust cycle. First, the fact that New
Columbia would be better able to take advantage of good times, but would be exposed
to more risk in bad times, counsels in favor of a constitutionally protected rainy day
fund. Such a rule might take the form of the budget rule used in Sweden, which requires
a 1% budget surplus over a business cycle." In any case, given states' traditional ten-
dency to underfund or raid their rainy day funds, such strong provisions would be
necessary to ensure that New Columbia could effectively weather downturns."
At the same time, the imposition of a state "balanced budget" requirement that
bars New Columbia from running year-to-year deficits would be a destructive mis-
step. For the reasons outlined above, New Columbia would likely have greater eco-
nomic swings than other states.59 A balanced budget rule would only exacerbate these
swings, preventing countercyclical spending in bad times and requiring increases in
good times.o Thus, the traditional benefits of balanced budget rules would not out-
weigh their unique disadvantages in the New Columbian context, and so they ought
to be avoided.
" Indeed, the 1997 financial challenge outlined above may be seen as the federal govern-
ment redistributing resources from the then generally prosperous nation into the locally
depressed District. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
5 See id.
* See Ed Dolan, How Smart Fiscal Rules Keep Sweden's Budget in Balance, Bus. INSIDER
(Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-smart-fiscal-rules-keep-swedens-budget
-in-balance-2011-8.
ss See Brian Galle & Kirk J. Stark, Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for Preventing State
Budget Crises, 87 IND. L.J. 599, 601 (2012). That said, D.C. has recently been doing a good
job of providing money for its rainy day fund. Benjamin R. Freed, D.C. Announces $417
Million Surplus to Be Added to 'Rainy-Day'Fund, DCIST (Jan. 29, 2013), http://dcist.com
/2013/01/dc announces_417_million surplus to.php.
s The new state would have to endure losing the government benefits Congress planned
to award it, but would gain the ability to tax out-of-state workers. See supra notes 16-26 and
accompanying text.
60 See Galle & Stark, supra note 58, at 600-01 (describing how states are vulnerable to the
cycle of recession-reinforcing budget crises).
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H. NEW COLUMBIAN POLITICS
Beyond its economic idiosyncrasies, New Columbia would also have a special
breed of state politics. In particular, it would face both the perils of limited party
competition and the promise of new forms of government innovation.
First, one must consider political competition in New Columbia. Traditionally,
big city politics are very different from national or state politics in an important way:
almost all non-mayoral races are what political scientists call "second order," or
determined by voter preferences at other levels of government-local city council
voting follows Presidential voting." In most big cities in America, this means there
is no partisan competition.62 This turns out to have dramatic effects on the outputs of
their legislatures.
As a city-state, New Columbia would effectively be a state government with the
politics of a big city. What would this mean? Most significantly, the absence of par-
tisan competition would make New Columbia's government less responsive to the
opinions of the general public. Statehood would take D.C.'s existing pathologies-
its reliance on "aldermanic privilege," the economically destructive limits it places on
growth, and its regular corruption-and open them to more policy areas.' However,
were its politics improved, statehood would also allow D.C. to serve as a model for new
combinations of policies that other cities, due to conflict with their state capitals, have
not been able to consider.
One need only quickly peruse election returns to see that D.C. has little general
election competition." Democrats win with percentages close to the huge percent-
ages that the President carried in D.C.6 6 One might think that, in an overwhelmingly
61 David Schleicher, Why Is There No More Partisan Competition in City Council
Elections?: The Role ofElection Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 419-20, 457 (2007) [hereinafter
Schleicher 2007] ("[T]he less prominent the race the more likelythatparty identification. ..will
predict a voter's selection.").
62 See id at 419-20; Christopher S. Elmendorf & David N. Schleicher, Informing
Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REv. 363,
388-90 (2013) (describing voter ignorance even in primary elections).
63 State legislative elections are frequently second-order, too, but to a lesser degree and
with different consequences in places where the parties are more competitive. See Elmendorf
& Schleicher, supra note 62, at 399-400 (defining a "second-order election" as one "in
which voters respond to candidates and candidates appeal for votes, on the basis of political
developments in a different area.").
' For an explanation of aldermanic privilege, see Schleicher 2013, supra note 2, at
1710-1711. For the pernicious impact of single-party rule, see id at 1699-1708.
61 See Election Results, D.C. BOARD OF ELECTIONS (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.dcboee
.org/election info/election results/.
66 See id., availableathttp://www.dcboee.org/election-info/election-results/2012/November
-6-General-Election/.
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Democratic town, the real competition is in primaries. But this misses a central distinc-
tion between primaries and general elections.67 Voters know little about individual
candidates in legislative races, but this is not particularly important in the general elec-
tions as voters can-and do-use the party membership of candidates as a heuristic
device." When voting for Congress, by simply knowing that a candidate is a Democrat
or Republican, voters can learn almost everything relevant about them. This is not true
in primaries at any level, which have no on-ballot heuristics to differentiate between,
say, centrist and liberal Democrats, never mind between candidates that differ on local
issues. Further, voters cannot use an understanding of how things have gone in the
past-what political scientists call retrospective voting6 -- because it is difficult to
know whether any individual candidate is responsible for current conditions, whereas
in general elections, voters can hold the party in control of the legislature responsible
for governmental successes or failures.
The absence ofparty competition has dramatic consequence in D.C. First, and most
obvious, is that D.C. has a substantial culture of political corruption. From the Marion
Barry imbroglio to investigations against Mayor Vincent Gray's campaigns, the District
has been repeatedly dogged by scandal.70 This sordid history confirms what theory
suggests: in the absence of competition, incumbents are less afraid of losing and more
willing to take risks, leading to corruption."
Second, the lack of political competition engenders irrational and suboptimal
neighborhood parochialism. As argued by Barry Weingast and John Ferejohn, among
others, legislatures can get into suboptimal equilibriums relying on distribution.72 The
most well known of these is pork barrel spending." A legislature can support lower
taxes and lower spending overall, but end up in a high spending, high tax equilibrium
6 Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 62, at 367, 388-89.
61 Id. at 386, 404.
69 See Jide 0. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation
ofPowers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REv. 617, 624 (2010).
70 See Paul Schwartzman & Mike DeBonis, D.C. Grapples with Culture of Corruption,
WASH. POST, June 9, 2012, at Al, Al 8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/dcs-political-corruption-has-deep-roots/2012/06/09/gJQAqvL9QVstory.html ("'Politicians
will say there's a culture of corruption, and often people say it's rhetoric,' said Bryan Weaver,
a Democratic activist who has campaigned for the council. 'But when it comes to D.C., there's
a culture of corruption that really exists. What gets passed off as politics as usual are huge
ethical lapses."').
7 David Schleicher, I Would, butlNeed the Eggs: WhyNeitherExitNor Voice Substantially
Limits Big City Corruption, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 277, 288 (2011).
72 JOHN A FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS: RIVERS AND HARBORS LEGISLATION,
1947-1968 233-52 (1974); Barry Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional
Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 249, 252-53 (1979).
" Gerald Gamm & ThadKousser, ContingentPartisanship: When Party Labels Matter-and
When They Don't-in the Distribution ofPork in American State Legislatures, AM. POL. SCI.
ASS'N 2013 ANNuAL MEETING 1 (2013), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2300304
(describing the large body of research in this area).
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because members most prefer spending in their districts. This prisoner's dilemma-
like set of preferences can result in a stable norm of all members supporting all other
members' projects because they are worried that deviating from this norm will result
in losing their own pork project.
Party competition is a key antidote for this type of bad norm development. As
Mathew McCubbins has shown, parties in legislatures exist in part to constrain their
members from offering amendments that might pass but would harm other party
members. 74 Backbenchers give party leaders the power to do this-to set the voting
rules and order-because the leaders have incentives to strengthen the party brands
across all seats. Party leaders can help their caucus out of these prisoner dilemma-like
"defect" equilibriums and into agreements to work in their collective interest." Strong
parties and strong party competition leads to less pork spending, something we can
see in today's Congress.76
Yet, as Gerald Gamm and Thad Kousser have shown, when such party competi-
tion is lacking, suboptimal log-rolling and protectionism prevail. In particular, Gamm
and Kousser note that uncompetitive legislatures feature more "district bills" or
decisions by a general legislature to pass bills that are specific to one area, usually
in deference to the member from that area and with little regard for their overall
aggregate impact on the polity.77
In one-party D.C., this "pork barrel" equilibrium is precisely what has played out.
Nowhere is the pattern clearer than in the field of housing development. D.C., as
noted above, faces a major crisis in affordable housing and office space. Yet, despite
the crisis, the city council has resisted permitting new construction." As previously
noted, part of the reason for this is the Height Act's limit on building heights.o Yet to
a substantial degree, construction has also been limited by ordinary municipal zoning
restrictions. Why would the City's leaders vote to zone out growth in a time of pros-
perity and opportunity? A key reason is the city council's tradition of "aldermanic
74 See generally GARY W. Cox & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (2d ed. 2007); GARY W. Cox & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, SETTING
THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
4-6 (2005); D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONALPARTIES AND THEAPPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 1-2 (Benjamin I. Page ed. 1991).
7 And of course to screw the other party! See generally Gamin & Kousser, supra note 73.
76 David Schleicher, How Polarization Cooked Congress's Pork, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 8,
2012,9:17 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/05/-how-polarization-cooked
-congresss-pork-.html.
1 See Gerald Gamm & Thad Kousser, BroadBills or Particularistic Policy?: Historical
Patterns in American State Legislatures, 104 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 151, 151, 165 (2010).
7 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
7 See Aaron Weiner, Cheh Considers Bill That Would Give ANCs More Input on
ResidentialBuildings, WASH. CITY PAPER (Mar. 29,2013), http://www.washingtoncitypaper
.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2013/03/29/cheh-considers-bill-that-would-give-more-input-on
-residential-buildings/ [hereinafter Weiner 1].
8o D.C. CODE § 6-601.05 (2012).
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privilege," a convention by which leaders defer to local advisory neighborhood com-
missions and the councilmember who represents the location of potential new build-
ing projects." This tradition directly parallels the sort of suboptimal "go along to get
along" equilibrium that characterizes one-party legislatures, and that would form the
core of political culture in New Columbia.
D.C.'s regular use of this aldermanic privilege, as abetted by a lack of party
competition, has led to deeply illogical outcomes. For instance, outside of downtown,
the most logical place in the city to build new housing is neighborhoods in upper
Northwest, where property values are high (evidence of demand) and density is low.82
However, "homevoters" in those neighborhoods do not like new construction, as it
would reduce the monopoly rents they get from owning in these ritzy areas.83 Why
doesn't the rest of the city council simply overrule them for the benefit of all? Why
does it sanction this type of protectionism by the city's richest residents? The answer
is aldermanic privilege. Zoning amendments, for all intents and purposes, must be
approved by the councilmember from the area." The rest of the council defers, lest
projects put their neighborhoods against the wishes of their homevoters. The result-
ing outcome is deeply unsatisfying.
Leaving decisions about the development of the upper Northwest in the hands of
its councilmember is no more attractive than leaving hedge fund regulation to the
Member of Congress from Greenwich, Connecticut, or gun safety regulation to the
representative from Madison, North Carolina (where Remington Arms is headquar-
tered). This type of norm is what prevails in the absence of partisan competition. If
D.C. were to gain statehood, then it would inherit the suboptimal "go along to get
along" equilibrium that all one-party polities tend to develop.
Can this fate be avoided? As a part of any move towards statehood-and even if
statehood does not occur-D.C. should consider reforms that make political compe-
tition more likely. I have proposed a number of these over the years." One that would
" See David Alpert, It's One City, Not Eight Cities, GREATER GREATER WASHINGTON
(Mar. 26,2012), http://greatergreaterwashington.org/post/14213/its-one-city-not-eight-cities/.
Here, I'm referring to areas in which developers would need a zoning amendment in order
to build. However, at least one member of the council (who is also on this panel) has asked
for city council approval even when projects are entirely compliant with local zoning rules
(i.e., when building is as-of-right). See Weiner 1, supra note 79.
82 Fedward Potz, The Rent Is Too Damn High, WE LOvE DC (Feb. 7, 2013, 8:00 AM),
http://www.welovedc.com/2013/02/07/the-rent-is-too-damn-high/; Aaron Wiener, Where the
Millennials Live (and Other Demographic Treasures), WASH. CITY PAPER (Dec. 11, 2013),
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2013/12/ 11/where-the-millennials
-live-and-other-demographic-treasures/.
8 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLU-
ENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLITICS 51-52
(2001); Schleicher 2013, supra note 2, at 1732.
* Schleicher 2013, supra note 2, at 1706-07.
8 Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 62, at 409-11; Schleicher 2007, supra note 61,
at 464-73.
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be particularly attractive in the context of D.C. would be allowing interest groups
that are able to gather enough signatures the ability to make on-ballot endorsements,
allowing voters to tell the difference between a Chamber of Commerce-supported
candidate and one supported by the Sierra Club-or whomever else." In any case,
such measures should be top priorities if the state of New Columbia is to overcome
a culture of corruption and reach better policy outcomes.
Fortunately, however, New Columbia's political culture would also offer striking
opportunities for innovation. In particular, the combination of a city and state govern-
ment opens uncharted and intriguing possibilities for policy development.
To the sort of innovation that state-city fusion might bring, consider land use. Most
cities lack the power to create different nuisance laws governing different neighbor-
hoods (since common law is the province of the states). As a result, cities are left
with the blunderbuss tool of restrictive land use rules, which often lead to excessive
separation of uses. For example, cities frequently and unnecessarily bar residents
from manufacturing zones because of the risk that residents would sue the manufac-
turers under nuisance laws." However, if the city could simply create a "special
nuisance zone,"" it would allow for residents who were willing to live in manufac-
turing zones to do so, creating a new space for housing expansions. As this possibility
demonstrates, the ability to mix state power with a city's preferences should open
up substantial policy areas for exploration.
Finally, the state of New Columbia might generate more radical innovations
simply because D.C.'s population is different from the populations of most states. For
instance, D.C. would be one of the nation's only majority-minority state,89 one of the
youngest states,90 and the state with the most LGBT residents by percentage (despite
being the eighth most LGBT city).91
Providing this population with the powers of Statehood might allow for new policy
innovations and experiments untried in the status quo that could yield substantial
benefits. Moreover, allowing populations that are minorities on the national stage
the full power of state government would allow for greater "dissenting by deciding,"
as Heather Gerken would note,92 making any dissents against national consensus
8 Schleicher 2007, supra note 61, at 425 (noting that, with only party affiliation on the
ballot, voters have little information regarding candidate's stances on local issues).
7 See Schleicher 2013, supra note 2, at 1681.
8 See generally id. at 1672, 1681.
89 Median Age, by State, USA TODAY (June 10, 2010), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com
/news/nation/census/median-age-by-state.htm.
90 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION BY RACE AND STATE: 2010 TBL. 19,
available at https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s00 1 9.pdf.
9' Jeremy W. Peters, The Gayest Place in America?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013, at 11,
14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/fashion/Washington-DC-has-thriving
-gay-lesbian-and-transgender-population.html? r-0&pagewanted=all.
92 See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745, 1770(2005).
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more powerful by providing an example of those dissents in action. Who knows what
differences would emerge, but it would create an incredibly exciting opportunity.
CONCLUSION
New Columbian Statehood would carry profound legal, political and economic
implications for the region. While we cannot anticipate every consequence this change
would bring, several are clear enough; economically, New Columbia would be better
poised to thrive in boom times, yet face starker risks in downturns, while politically,
it would enjoy a new scope for innovation, but would suffer the harms of single-party
corruption. This list is far from complete, but by turning our focus to these sorts of
impacts and dynamics, we can begin to understand just what statehood would offer
to the people of New Columbia.
